The Internationalization of RMB: RMB Potential International Status and its Influence on ASEAN by Gui, Linjie
   
 
Master programme in International Economics 
 with a Focus on China 
 
 
The Internationalization of the RMB:  
RMB Potential International Status and its  
Influence on ASEAN 
 
Linjie Gui 
       linjie.gui.837@student.lu.se 
 
Abstract: The restrictions on China s´ capital account is the major restrictive 
factor for the international use of  the RMB. The potential international 
status of  the RMB must be included into the consideration by the monetary 
authority in designing the pace and form of  liberalizing the restrictions, 
because, in general, the potential international status directly induces the 
potential benefits and risks. The purpose of  this paper is to estimate the 
potential international status of  the RMB. Based on the model, the share of  
RMB in reserve holding would be about 7.2% in this thesis. In addition, this 
thesis suggests that RMB has the potential to become a regional anchor 
currency in Southeast Asia. More specifically, RMB has increasing 
influences on the exchange rates of  ASEAN members. 
 
Key words: RMB, currency internationalization, international status, anchor 
currency. 
 
 
EKHR81  
Master thesis (15 credits ECTS) 
August 2012  
Supervisor: Christer Gunnarsson 
Examiner: Jonas Ljungberg 
  
                                                                    
Website  www.ehl.lu.se 
  
  
 Acknowledgements 
        
       The author thanks Professor Christer Gunnarsson, Professor Sonja Opper and Professor Jonas 
Ljungberg for their constructive support and advice through this master s´ program.   
 
Moreover, a thank you to his friend Aiting and Guo for their understanding and help. 
        
       Finally, the author would like to express his gratitude to his family for the constant support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction.....................................................................................................1 
2. Research Background and Literature Review…………….......…………..4 
2.1 What is an international currency..................................................................................4 
              2.2 Why does China wish to promote RMB internationalization........................................5 
              2.3 What China has done to promote RMB internationalization………………………….9 
3. Theory……………………………………………………………………..…15 
4. Data and Methodology…………...…………………………………..….…..17 
4.1 The determinants of the international status of a currency………………………….17 
4.2 The potential international status of the RMB as an international reserve currency..27 
4.3 RMB s´ influence on the exchange rates of ASEAN members……………………...28 
5. Conclusion........................................................................................................35 
          References.............................................................................................................37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
1. Introduction 
 
“Sterling was the last to lose its status in the first half of the 20th century and the dollar will 
lose its status in the first half of this century.” 
                                ----- Avinash Persaud of the U.S, Sate Bank and trust 
 
After the World War II, the U.S. dollar generally replaced the pound sterling as the dominant 
currency. However, decades later, economists (e.g., Chinn and Frankel, 2005; Elwell, 2007; 
Galati and Wooldridge, 2009) are discussing the probability that the U.S. dollar would lose its 
central status in the next decades. Although the quote of Persaud (2004) might sound rather 
radical, it is not unrealistic. In fact, since 1999, the birth of the euro, euro was encroaching on 
the U.S. dollar s´ international position. Euro s´ share in the total reserves holdings that were 
allocated to the International Monetary Fund increased from 18% in 1999 to 26% in 2010. In 
the meantime, the U.S. dollar s´ share decreased from more than 70% in 1999 to about 60% in 
2010. 
 
Apart from the euro, there is another currency has become a new potential challenger to the 
U.S. dollar. It is the Chinese renminbi. In the global financial crisis in 2008, Zhou Xiaochuan 
(2009), the governor of People s´ Bank of China, has suggested to reform the existing 
international monetary system. Even though Zhou (2009) never mentioned the words “the 
U.S.” or “dollar” in his article, the article was viewed as a provocation towards the United 
States. Since the U.S. dollar plays the central role in the existing international monetary 
system, it is believed that Zhou s´ real purpose of reforming the international monetary system 
is to lower the international status of the U.S. dollar and enhance the influence of the Chinese 
renminbi. 
 
During the past thirty years, China has experienced rapid economic growth. Nowadays, as the 
second largest economy and a key driver in the world, China has the attempt to pursue the 
internationalization of its own currency in the early years of this century. After the outbreak 
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of the global financial crisis in 2008, China s´ monetary authority accelerated the 
internationalization of renminbi. Through a series of policies and cooperation agreements 
with other countries, at present, the international use of the renminbi is much wider than few 
years ago. However, there are a lot of obstacles waiting to be overcome if the China s´ 
monetary authority would intend to promote the renminbi to be a real international currency. 
The major obstacle is the restrictions on the capital account convertibility (CAC). The 
Reserve Bank of India (1997) has defined CAC as follows: CAC refers to the freedom to 
convert the local financial assets into foreign financial assets and vice-versa at market 
determined rates of exchange. That is the freedom of currency conversion in relation to 
capital transactions in terms of inflows and outflows. The openness of the capital account can 
bring not only significant benefits but also risks to the country. On the one hand, the 
liberalization of capital account can improve the efficiency of its domestic financial market, 
and lead to a better allocation of both saving and investment. On the other hand, the 
liberalization increases the vulnerability of the economy to swings in sentiment, because 
international capital flows tend to be highly sensitive to macroeconomic policies, to the 
soundness of the banking system, and to economics and political developments (Fischer, 
1998). The restriction on China s´ capital account is the major restrictive factors for the 
international use of the renminbi. Capital account convertibility is a prerequisite for 
international currency. A high convertibility of the renminbi will increase the incentives of 
individuals and institutions to use and hold renminbi. However, for the health of the domestic 
economy and the safe of the financial market, China s´ monetary authority sets a certain 
number of restrictions on the convertibility of the renminbi. When and how China should 
open its capital account must be fully considered by its policymakers. The overall benefits 
and risks must be estimated before removing the restrictions on the renminbi. Without doubt, 
the liberalization of the restrictions on currency convertibility should be in harmony with the 
overall development and reform strategy, not just for the internationalization of the renminbi. 
Nevertheless, when China s´ monetary authority tries to evaluate the overall influences of the 
openness of capital account, the benefits and risks of the internalization of the renminbi could 
not be negligible, and these benefits and risks are determined directly by the international 
status of the renminbi. Therefore, the potential international status of the renminbi must be 
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included into the consideration by the monetary authority in designing the pace and form of 
liberalizing the restrictions on currency convertibility, because, in general, the potential 
international status reflects the potential benefits and risks. Based on the experiences of other 
international currencies, it is achievable to estimate the potential of the renminbi as an 
international currency. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the potential international 
status of the renminbi. Specifically, the share of a currency in reserve holding of the world s´ 
central banks is viewed as a proxy for the overall international status of the currency. And a 
model is established to explore the main factors which determine the share. Based on the 
model, renminbi s´ potential internationalization status is estimated in this thesis. In addition, 
this thesis also discusses whether the renminbi has the potential to become a regional anchor 
currency in Southeast Asia. More specifically, renminbi s´ influences on the exchange rates of 
ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members are estimated and compared 
in this thesis. 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Based on the previous literatures, the 
next section discusses the definition of an international currency and the benefits and risks of 
internationalization of the renminbi. China s´ efforts for improving the international status of 
the renminbi are also reviewed in this section, following two tracks: trade track and finance 
track. Section 3 introduces a number of previous researches on international currency, both 
the theories from economic perspective and from economy perspective. In the section 4, the 
empirical analysis section, two models were established. The first model is used to explore 
the determinants of international reserve currency shares. Based on the first model, the 
potential share of the renminbi in the reserve holdings is attained under assumption that the 
restrictions on renminbi s´ convertibility are removed. The second model is set to estimate the 
influences of the renminbi on the exchange rates of ASEAN members. Some conclusions and 
suggestions are presented in the final section of this thesis. 
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2. Research Background and Literature Review 
 
2. 1 What is an international currency? 
 
Hundreds of empires rose and collapsed in history. Although most of these empires have 
issued their own national currencies, only few of them served as a generally accepted means 
of payment in international transactions. Lopez (1951) suggested that the gold solidus of the 
Byzantine Empire in the medieval Mediterranean World is “the dollar of the Middle Age”, 
because it was accepted everywhere and no kingdom has a currency that can be compared to 
it at that time. In the seventh century, the Byzantine coin was replaced by the dinar of the 
Arabs. In the thirteenth century, the florin of Florence became the dominant currency. Its 
dominance continued until the fifteenth century and was taken over by the ducato of Venice 
(Cipolla, 1956). Then, the pound sterling played the dominant role in international trading 
until the World War I. The US dollar became the dominant currency after World War II 
(Yeager, 1976). 
 
There is a relatively respected definition of international currency. According to Chinn and 
Frankel (2005), and international currency is one that is used outside its home country. Kenen 
(2009) gave a more detailed definition of international currency, he described an international 
currency is the one that is used and held beyond the borders of the issuing country, not merely 
for transactions with that country s´ residents but also for transactions between non-residents. 
Basic on the classic three functions of money domestically: store of value, medium of 
exchange and unit of account, Kenen (1983) introduced early thoughts on the roles of 
international currency, and Chinn and Frankel (2005) developed a list of the international 
functions of an international currency, as summarized in table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 the functions of an international currency 
Function of money Governments Private actors 
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Store of value International Reserves Currency substitution and investment 
Medium of exchange Foreign exchange market Vehicle currency, invoicing trade and 
financial transactions, settlement currency 
Unit of account Anchor for pegging local currency Denominating trade and financial 
transactions 
Source: Chinn and Frankel (2005). 
2.2 Why does China wish to promote RMB internationalization? 
 
There are lots of economists and political scientists have studied the benefits of having an 
international currency (e.g., Chinn and Frankel, 2005; Andrews, 2006; Gao and Yu, 2009). It 
is widely recognized that internationalization can bring enormous benefits to the issuing 
country. For China, the benefits from the internationalization of the renminbi can be 
discussed from two perspectives: 
 
International perspective: 
 
1. The internationalization of the renminbi will contribute to establish a more stable 
international monetary system. In the world s´ major economic regions, the United States 
has dollar, the Europe has euro, but the East Asia has no common currency to support this 
region s´ economy. As the largest economy in East Asia, meanwhile, the second largest 
economy in the world, China has huge influence in this region, and its currency renminbi 
is widely viewed as the principal Asian currency. Internationalization of the renminbi can 
contribute to retain the balance between these three major economic regions and to the 
establishment of a stable international monetary system supported by the reasonable 
economic policies of the United States, Euro zone and China. 
 
2. The internationalization of the renminbi will contribute to the stability of exchange rates 
of East Asian currencies. China is playing the role of leader in East Asia, with the steady 
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increase in trade volume between China and other Asian countries, China s´ renminbi has 
greater impacts on the exchange rate of East Asian currencies. Improving the 
international role of the renminbi can contribute to the stability of exchange rates of East 
Asian currencies, and to the stability of East Asian economies. 
 
Domestic perspective: 
 
Kenen (2009) suggests that the benefits of currency internationalization accrue largely to a 
country s´ private sector and are fairly obvious. 
 
1. The internationalization of the renminbi would reduce the exchange rate risk of Chinese 
exporters and importers. The widespread international acceptance of renminbi means that 
more foreign trade would be invoiced and settled in the renminbi, so the Chinese 
exporters and importers are able to shift exchange rate risk to their foreign customers. 
Chinn and Frankel (2005) has commented the international role of the U.S. dollar, they 
suggested “the global use of the dollar, as with the global use of the English language, is a 
natural advantage that American businessmen tend to take for granted”. 
 
2. The renminbi s´ internationalization offers China s´ financial institutions more new profit 
opportunities. The internationalization of renminbi creates the possibility for developing 
new financial service businesses for the country s´ banks and other financial institutions, 
and it would also contribute to improve the competitiveness of Chinese financial 
institutions. Chinese banks have a comparative advantage at dealing in dollars, as U.S. 
banks at dealing in dollars and British banks at dealing in pounds. Furthermore, the 
domestic non-financial sector would also benefit from the development of China s´ 
financial sector, because a larger financial sector usually means a lower cost of capital 
and more financial services. 
 
3. Seignorage. Chinn and Frankel (2005) suggest that seignorage is perhaps the most 
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important benefit of having other countries hold one s´ currency. With the 
internationalization of the renminbi, more and more non-residents would hold renminbi 
for its international functions, and the China s´ monetary authority would collect 
seignorage from these non-residents. Seigniorage is the margin between the denomination 
of the notes and the cost of issuing the notes obtained by the note issuer. Issuing an 
international currency is equivalent to levying seigniorage on other countries (Gao and Yu, 
2009). The non-residents who use the international currency must give up their goods and 
services or the ownership of the real capital stock in order to obtain a certain amount of 
international currency. Currently, since U.S. dollar is the key currency, the United States 
can collect seigniorage from all over the world. Although China s´ renminbi is not 
expected to replace the status of U.S dollar in a short period of time, the 
internationalization of the renminbi could at least counteract some seigniorage that China 
has to pay to the United States. 
 
4. Political power and prestige. Some political scientists, for example, Andrews (2006) and 
Cohen (2006) have suggested that key role of U.S. dollar has significantly enhance the 
international influence of the United States. They emphasized that the United States 
benefits from the reserve currency status of U.S. dollar, and the United States has 
disproportionate impacts on the policies and activities of international financial 
institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (Kenen, 2009). With the rapid 
growth in economy, the Chinese authority is pursuing a greater say in the international 
community. The internationalization of renminbi is supposed to enhance China s´ 
international status and will increase its influence. 
 
 
5. The internationalization of the renminbi will contribute to preserve the value of its 
significant amounts of foreign exchange reserves. China replaced Japan as the biggest 
holder of foreign exchange reserves in the world in 2006. The vast foreign exchange 
reserves are wealth to China, but the authority must face the risk of devaluation. All 
China s´ foreign exchange reserves are denominated in foreign reserve currencies, the 
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major reserve currency is the U.S. dollar. China has to bear the huge risk of the 
devaluation of the U.S. dollar. If the United States carried out some loose monetary 
policies, it can easily inflate away China s´ dollar reserves. The internationalization of the 
renminbi would contribute to reduce China s´ excessive foreign exchange reserves. If the 
reserves were denominated in the renminbi, China would not need to worry about the loss 
from devaluation. 
 
Although these significant benefits can be obtained by the internationalization of the 
renminbi, the costs are also obvious. Chinn and Frankel (2005) have suggested that there are 
three major disadvantages of having an international currency, which are the reasons why 
Germany and Japan were reluctant to internationalize their currencies in the past. These 
disadvantages also explain why, until now, there has been no formal declaration of 
internationalization as official Chinese policy. These three costs are: 
 
1. The “impossible trinity”. The Nobel Laureate Mundell (1993) has pointed out that it was 
impossible to have all three of the following at the same time: a fixed exchange rate, 
perfect capital mobility, and an independent monetary policy. For example, if a country 
would like to maintain a fixed exchange rate and allow free capital flows, it has to give up 
the independence of its monetary policy. There is an intrinsic incompatibility between 
these three goals. As Kenen (2009) suggested, although currency internationalization does 
not require the authority to remove all restrictions on capital movements, a significant 
degree of capital account liberalization and convertibility are prerequisites of the 
internationalization. Cohen (2012) described renminbi as one of the most tightly 
controlled currencies in the world. China has to gradually remove most restrictions on 
capital account for internationalizing renminbi. The authority has to give up one goal 
among fixed exchange rates and independence of monetary policy. Actually, Hong Kong 
has abandoned the use of monetary policy and adopted the fixed exchange rates. On the 
contrary, Singapore Monetary Authority has chosen to rely on exchange rate changes to 
affect domestic economic activity. 
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2. Larger fluctuations in demand for renminbi. The internationalization would increase the 
amount of the currency circulates beyond the country s´ borders. If China s´ asset were 
made available to non-residents, the demand for renminbi would increase, and huge 
inflows of capital might appreciate renminbi drastically. The significant increase in 
exchange rate of renminbi would render exporters less competitive on world markets. In 
another situation, if the foreign holders come to believe that China s´ asset price may fall 
sharply, renminbi has a very high possibility of suffering a large depreciation. Moreover, 
foreign sales of renminbi assets will lead to the depreciation of their prices, and China s´ 
domestic investors will suffer losses. 
 
3. More international responsibilities. The internationalization of renminbi will bring huge 
benefits to China, at the same time, with more international responsibilities. Actually, as 
the current key currency, the U.S. dollar is the center of international monetary system, 
any policy of the U.S. monetary authority would influence whole global economy. Thus, 
the U.S. authority has to take into account the impacts of their policies on international 
market, that means the U.S. could not solely focus on its domestic objectives, other 
countries  ´ benefits also should be considered. The internationalization of the renminbi 
would enhance its international status significantly. When China enjoys the benefits from 
renminbi s´ international role, it also needs to take the corresponding responsibilities. 
 
2.3 What China has done to promote RMB internationalization?  
 
Cohen (1998) has pointed out that the size of a currency territory lies on two sides: one is a 
visible hand, and the other is an invisible hand. The visible hand is the monopoly of the 
government upon currency issue and monetary management. For national currency, its 
domestic circulation is enforced by the national government through a variety of legal 
restrictions. The government ensures the dominant status of the national currency in the 
administrative area. Since the legal restrictions merely work at home, so the visible hand is 
only significant interiorly. While the invisible hand plays an important role outside the 
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borders of the nation. The invisible hand means the effects of market on the transaction 
network. After analyzing the several popular international currencies over the last two 
centuries, Frankel (2011) suggested that none of them came into widespread use due to the 
efforts of official planning by a formal governmental bureaucracy. A national currency can 
turn into an international currency, because its inherent qualities are attractive to traders, 
investors, and other interested agents. For example, the decline of sterling and the rise of the 
U.S. dollar were a result of an unplanned process of competition among them. Krugman 
(1984) argued that the internationalization of the U.S. dollar was driven by the spontaneous 
evolution of preferences on the demand side of the market and was a result of the invisible 
hand. However, these discussions about the “two hands” do not mean it is impossible to 
manufacture an international currency. Genberg (2009) has discussed the feasibility of 
promoting the international use of a currency by policy interventions. He suggested that it is 
possible to find justifications for government assistance to currency internationalization and it 
is possible to manufacture an international currency if the authority could design enough 
reasonable policies. Cohen (2012) has pointed directly that there is nothing in Beijing s´ 
experience to suggest that China cannot internationalize its renminbi although there are limits 
to use the authority s´ power to promote the internationalization of the renminbi. But frankly, 
China s´ efforts for the internationalization of the renminbi which were described as 
“managed internationalization” by McCauley (2011) are unprecedented in recent history. As 
the second largest economy, largest trading nation, and the largest foreign holder of foreign 
exchange reserves, China has the motivation to improve the international status of renminbi 
to match its economic status in the global economy. As mentioned above, the managed 
internationalization of the renminbi is unique in modern times, so the Chinese government 
follows the previous leader Deng Xiaoping´s instruction “crossing the river by feeling for 
stones”, implements its policies gradually. However, the authority speeded up the 
internationalization of the renminbi since the outbreak of the global financial crisis 
(2007-2008). Song and Song (2012) suggest that the financial crisis in 2008 caused a severe 
global recession and also changed the global economic structure, and the crisis provided a 
golden chance for renminbi internationalization. People s´ Bank of China Governor Zhou 
Xiaochuan (2009) has published his article “Reform the International Monetary System” 
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during the financial crisis in 2009, and this article was viewed as an attempt to destabilize the 
domination of the U.S. dollar and improve the international status of the renminbi. 
 
Subacchi (2010) has pointed out that China is pursuing a two-track strategy: trade track and 
financial track. Following the trade track, the authority is trying to boost cross-border usage 
of the renminbi in trade settlements. Following the financial track, China is making the RMB 
attractive to oversea investors by building an offshore market in Hong Kong for 
RMB-denominated assets. China s´ efforts along both tracks will be analyzed below: 
 
Trade track: 
 
1. The local currency swap agreements. 
 
In December 2008, China launched its aggressive campaign of currency swap diplomacy. 
People s´ Bank of China and Bank of Korea announced that they agreed a currency swap deal 
in order to safeguard against any global financial crisis and strengthen their trade ties. Until 
now, China has signed about 18 currency swap agreements over the past four years with 
countries including South Korea, Hong Kong, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Belarus, Iceland, 
Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and Brazil. On the surface, the aim of these agreements 
was to safeguard against another global financial crisis. These agreements offer China s´ 
trading partner a helpful hedge against the future liquidity shortage. In emergency situations, 
these countries can use the renminbi as a settlement currency when trading with China. In 
fact, Cohen (2012) suggested that these agreements will provide indirect encouragement for 
commercial use of the renminbi, and they are seen as helping the internationalization of the 
renminbi. 
 
2. The cross border trade settlement pilot scheme. 
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In December 2008, the cross border trade settlement pilot scheme was introduced by People s´ 
Bank of China. This pilot scheme allows a limited number of firms in five Chinese cities 
(Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Dongwan) to settle trade transactions in 
renminbi with counterparts in Hong Kong, Macao, and ASEAN members. One year later, in 
June 2010, another 15 provinces and cities on the mainland were included into the pilot 
scheme. Meanwhile, the number of firms on the mainland authorized to participate the pilot 
scheme has increased from 365 to more than 67,000. In September 2011, the coverage was 
expended to all provinces and cities in China. This scheme is viewed as a directly way to 
promote the renminbi s´ use by non-residents, it increases the amount of the renminbi held 
overseas, and reduces reliance on the U.S. dollar. At the same time, the BRIC leaders are 
pursuing the ways to reduce their reliance on the U.S dollar. The leaders have advocated for 
“local currency trade settlement arrangement between our countries” (II BRIC Summit, 2010) 
on several BRIC summits. Apparently, it is a way to promote the international status of the 
renminbi, although, so far, limited actions have been taken by BRIC. 
 
Finance track 
 
The implementation of currency swap agreements and the cross border trade settlement pilot 
scheme would increase the amount of the renminbi held overseas. Therefore, the second track 
of China s´ strategy for internationalizing the renminbi has to focus on providing enough and 
attractive renminbi-denominated financial products to renminbi holders. But, currently, 
China s´ capital account is still under its strict control. So, the challenge here is to develop 
sufficient financial products without opening China s´ capital account. Hong Kong is a perfect 
solution. Hong Kong is one of the largest international financial centers in the world, and 
China is trying to develop a renminbi offshore market in Hong Kong. Hong Kong is a good 
way of overcoming restricted convertibility on the mainland. Frankel (2011) suggested this is 
an unusual solution, “never before has any government sought deliberately to develop an 
offshore market for its currency while still maintaining strict financial control at home”. 
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1. The renminbi deposit account in Hong Kong. 
 
In February 2004, authorized banks in Hong Kong began to open renminbi deposit account 
for individuals and firms. The renminbi deposits increased rapidly since 2010, while the 
restrictions on the renminbi accounts were relaxed significantly. The smooth and robust 
expansion of renminbi deposits is significant helpful to promote the internationalization of 
the renminbi. A huge pool of renminbi deposits is the foundation of the renminbi offshore 
market in Hong Kong, and it contributes to the development of the renminbi-denominated 
financial products. The total value of renminbi deposits in Hong Kong has grown from less 
than 55 billion yuan in April 2009 to as much as 576 billion yuan in March 2012. 
 
2. The renminbi-denominated bonds market in Hong Kong. 
 
In order to provide more investment opportunities for renminbi holders in Hong Kong, China 
tries to develop an offshore renminbi bonds market, the dim sum bond market. It is also a 
way to facilitate renminbi flows back into the onshore market. In June 2007, People s´ Bank 
of China and National Development and Refrom Commission jointly issued “the interim 
measures for the administration of the issuance of renminbi bonds in Hong Kong special 
administrative region by financial institutions within the territory of China”. One month later, 
China Development Bank became the first issuer in renminbi-denominated bond, with an 
amount of renminbi 5 billion and a tenor of 2 years. Until now, there are several types of 
issuers, including Ministry of Finance of Chinese government, foreign and Chinese banks and 
enterprises. The total issuance of renminbi bonds has increased from less than 10 billion yuan 
in 2007 to more than 100 billion yuan in June 2012. Although the volume is small, it grows 
steadily. 
 
3. The renminbi-denominated stocks in Hong Kong. 
 
In order to provide more financial products for renminbi holder in Hong Kong, China was 
pursuing to introduce Chinese firms to Hong Kong s´ stock market. In April 2011, a Chinese 
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property investment trust, named Hui Xian, raised 10.48 billion yuan in the first initial public 
offering outside mainland China to be denominated in renminbi. In October 2011, the 
Renminbi Equity Trading Support Facility was launched by the stock exchange of Hong 
Kong for the trading of renminbi denominated shares in the secondary market. The measures 
provide more investment opportunities for foreign investors, and contribute to develop 
renminbi into a currency that foreign investors are willing to hold. 
 
4. The renminbi qualified foreign institutional investor scheme. 
 
In December 2011, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the People s´ Bank of China, 
and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange jointly issued pilot measures concerning 
the launching of the Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor Scheme in China. 
Qualified institutional investors were allowed to use the renminbi funds raised in Hong Kong 
to invest in the domestic securities market in Mainland China. The issuance of this scheme 
was viewed as a further step to internationalize renminbi. It would further enhance Hong 
Kong s´ role as the renminbi offshore market, and it would offer a channel for offshore 
renminbi flow back to the Mainland. 
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3. Theory 
 
Theoretical discussion on currency internationalization generally starts with the functions of 
the international currency. These functions were widely used to define international currency. 
Chey (2012) suggested that the functional conceptualization of international currencies 
provides a basic framework for analyzing currency internationalization. Chinn and Frankel 
(2005) developed a list of the international currency s´ functions, and based on the table, they 
found that the international status of a currency is usually determined by the size of the 
economy, the stability of the currency s´ value, and the development of the financial market 
and network externality. Helleiner (2008) grouped the major determinants of currency 
internationalization into three broad categories: confidence, liquidity, and transactional 
network. The selection of the potential independent variables for the first model will follow 
their theories. 
 
Koepke (2009) has demonstrated the rationale for optimum anchor currency area (OACA). 
An OACA is a regional grouping of countries that peg their currencies to the same anchor 
currency. He suggested that with the increase in shares of intra-regional trade volume, 
countries may benefit from pegging to a regional anchor, even no monetary union exists in 
the area. Actually, with the establishment of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, the trade 
volume between ASEAN and China increased rapidly. The OACA theory shows that it is 
feasible to promote the renminbi as an anchor currency in Southeast Asia, at least in theory. 
Actually, the second model in this thesis is designed to investigate whether the renminbi has a 
trend to be an anchor currency in ASEAN. 
 
As discussed above, the functional conceptualization was widely adopted in economics 
research. Actually, there are also a growing number of political economy studies on 
international currency. Strange (1971) suggested that the international status of a currency is 
shaped by both economic and political factors. Helleiner (2008) suggested that political 
factors have impacts on currency s´ international status through the three economic factors: 
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confidence, liquidity and transactional networks. For example, government can use their 
political resources and administrative power to establish new market or spread their clearing 
and payments system to influence its currency s´ international role. Meanwhile, political 
economy researches suggested that the issuing country can obtain international monetary 
power from the international role of a currency. The power exists when its monetary 
relationship with another country influences that country s´ behavior (Andrews, 2006). For 
example, the issuing country can use monetary policy to pressure foreign countries to obtain 
benefits from them. For example, the United States has used the Quantitative Easing Policy to 
pressure China to purchase more US Treasure. Strange (1971) has classified international 
currencies into four groups: top currency, master currency, neutral currency and negotiated 
currency. She pointed that out master currency disappears today. And the U.S. dollar was 
viewed as a top currency before financial crisis which attractive because of the huge 
economic advantages of the United States. Neutral currency is Swiss franc which is attractive 
because it is stable with its own advantages. The last one is the negotiated currency, and its 
issuing country negotiates politically with other states for their future use of its currency, 
offering inducements such as military or diplomatic supports or economic benefits (Chey, 
2012). 
 
In the previous section of this thesis, both benefits and costs of the currency 
internationalization are discussed. However, the benefits and the costs are treated as static. 
Chey (2012) suggested that the balance between the benefits and the costs of issuing an 
international currency should change over time. Matsuyama et al (1991) have developed a 
two country model of the world economy, and he suggested that a country can improve its 
national welfare by internationalizing its currency, when the currency supply is fixed, a 
decrease in demand would reduce the national welfare. Mundell (1993) pointed out that the 
benefits of issuing an international currency are likely to decline over time, and the costs tend 
to increase. Thus, China must prepare for both benefits and costs with the internationalization 
of the renminbi. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
 
4.1 The determinants of the international status of a currency 
 
As shown in the table 1 above, there are three classic functions of a currency: medium of 
exchange, store of value and unit of account. If the currency is an international currency, each 
of these three classic functions can be discussed in two different situations: official use and 
private use. The international status of a currency is reflected in the “indicators” of these 
three classic functions. For example, the share of a currency in the reserve holdings of the 
world s´ central banks is viewed as an indicator for its role as a store of value; the share of an 
invoicing currency in international trade can be used to measure this currency s´ international 
function as a medium of exchange; similarly, a currency s´ use as a unit of account can be 
evaluated by the percentage of bonds and notes which are denominated in this currency in the 
international bonds and notes markets. Ideally, each classic function should be discussed to 
assess the international status of a currency. With limited data available, the empirical 
analysis in this thesis only tries to evaluate the current major currencies  ´international status 
based on their shares in the reserve holding of the world s´ central banks and explores the 
main determinants of the shares. Actually, with the existence of economies of scope and scale, 
if a currency is held by many central banks as part of their foreign exchange reserves, this 
currency is more likely to be used as an invoicing currency in international trade and 
financial transactions. Yu (2012) suggests that being a reserve currency is the ultimate goal of 
the internationalization of a currency. So, it is reasonable to assume that reserve currency 
holding is a good proxy for the overall international status of a currency. 
 
The data for the models in this thesis are mainly obtained from the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Federation of Exchanges. The shares of major currencies in world s´ 
central banks are calculated from the data of the Currency Composition of Official Foreign 
Exchange Reserves (COFER). In the COFER, total foreign exchange holdings are separated 
into two different groups: allocated reserves and unallocated reserves. COFER data are 
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reported on a voluntary basis, some countries have the opinion that the structure of their 
foreign exchange reserves are strictly confidential, thus they just provide total value instead 
of the detailed composition of their foreign reserves. Then, the reserves of these countries are 
named “unallocated reserves”. Nevertheless, all developed economies and some developing 
economies chose to report the composition of their foreign reserves to the COFER, their 
reserves are named “allocated reserves”. The allocated reserves still are in the majority in 
total reserves since 1995. Thus, only the data of the “allocated reserves” were used in this 
thesis. The allocated reserves is composed of five major international currency (U.S. dollar, 
euro, pounds sterling, Japanese yen and Swiss francs) and others currencies. The sample 
period of the empirical analysis in this thesis is 1999 to 2010, since the introduction of the 
euro in 1999. The Chart 1 shows changes of the reserve shares of the five major currencies 
from 1999 to 2010. 
Chart 1: Reserve currencies shares 
 
Source: the International Monetary Fund, author s´ calculations 
 
As shown in the table 1, the reserve share of the U.S. dollar had an obvious decline, 
decreased from more than 70% in 1999 to about 60% in 2010. Meanwhile, the reserve share 
of euro rose from 18% in 1999 to 26%. Apparently, the euro s´ launch in 1999 had negative 
impacts on the international status of the U.S. dollar. The introduction of the euro provided an 
alternative to the U.S. dollar for other central banks. Actually, there are a plenty of researches 
focus on the euro versus dollar debate (see e.g. Chinn and Frankel, 2005; Galati and 
Wooldridge, 2009). Some of them (e.g. Frankel and Wei, 1994) pointed out that the U.S. 
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dollar would still retain its central role in international trade and finance as both a store of 
value and a medium of exchange. The share of the Japanese yen fell from 6.4% in 1999 to 3.7% 
in 2010. Actually, the internationalization of Japanese yen in the second half of 1990s is 
viewed as a failed attempt. The pounds sterling s´ share increased slightly, from 2.9% in 1999 
to 3.9% in 2010. The share of Swiss franc fell from 0.23 to 0.13. Undoubtedly, until now, the 
U.S. dollar still retains its dominance as a leading international reserve currency. 
 
The potential determinants of international reserve currency shares 
 
There are some previous literatures focused on what determines reserve currency status of a 
currency (e.g., Chinn and Frankel, 2005). Chen et al (2009) suggested that in the short term, 
the exchange rate and interest rate movements would impact the reserve share of a currency, 
and in the long term, the currency s´ international status is determined by a number of 
fundamental factors. Five factors are discussed as independent variables to explore the 
potential determinants of international reserve share. 
 
1. The economic size. 
 
Generally, the size of the economy is measured by the gross domestic product (GDP). 
According to the data from the IMF, the United States was the largest economy over the last 
decades. In 1999, the United States accounted for about 24 percent of the total global GDP. 
Since then, it experienced a steady and slight decrease, from 23.67 percent in 1999 to 19.47 
percent in 2010. Despite all this, nowadays, the United States still is the largest economy in 
the world. The second economy, the Euro Area accounts for 14.24 percent in 2010. Almost all 
previous researches had listed GDP share as a potential determinants of international reserve 
currency share. Chinn and Frankel (2005) have suggested that there is a positive relationship 
between GDP share and the reserve share of the currency based on the data before 1999. 
They pointed out “the currency of a country that has a large share in output, trade and finance 
has a big natural advantage”. In this thesis, table 2 shows the relationship between GDP share 
and reserve currency share based on the data from 1999 to 2010. As shown in table 2, the 
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high GDP share always couple with high reserve share, and low GDP generally couple with 
low reserve share. 
 
Chart 2: GDP share versus reserve share (1999-2010) 
 
Source: the International Monetary Fund, author s´ calculations 
 
2. The development of financial market 
 
Chinn and Frankel (2005) suggested that a free and well-developed financial market would 
contribute to promote the currency s´ international status. Review the history of the pounds 
sterling, London used to be the largest financial center when the world was under the region 
of pounds sterling. Until the end of the World War II, the U.S. dollar became the new premier 
international currency. At the same time, the New York also replaced London as the largest 
financial center. Actually, the several current largest financial markets are located in the home 
countries of the five major international currencies mentioned above. Generally, a large and 
well-developed financial market can provide more investment opportunities and financial 
services to international investors. The participants of the market can lend or borrow money 
at relative low transaction costs. The former Federal Reserve Chairman, Greenspan (2001) 
has suggested that a large, open and well-developed financial market can help investors to 
hedge currency risk and manage their portfolio efficiently. The advantages of such financial 
markets are attractive to international investors, particularly those central banks of various 
countries. Thus, the development of the financial market in the home country is viewed as an 
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important determinant of a currency´s international status. There are several “indicators” for 
financial market development. Chinn and Frankel (2005) used the foreign exchange turnover 
in the major financial centers to measure the development of these financial centers. They 
also suggested the market capitalization is an alternative proxy for the development of 
financial centers. Thus, in this thesis, the market capitalization was used to measure the 
development of financial centers. The raw data of stock markets of the five economies (the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan and Euro area) was collected from the 
World Federation of Exchanges. These raw data was used to calculate the share of each stock 
market capitalization in the total of the five countries. The share of the United States 
fluctuates around 55 percent since 1999. And the Euro area has the second largest stock 
market capitalization, it accounts for about 20 percent over the past ten years. Japan has the 
third largest stock market among these five countries and its share experienced a slight 
decrease from 14.7% in 1999 to 12.8% in 2010. The shares of the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland maintained at about 10 percent and 3 percent from 1999 to 2010, respectively. As 
shown in chart 3, large market capitalization unites with high reserve share, and low share of 
market capitalization generally couple with low reserve share. 
 
Chart 3: Reserve share versus Market capitalization share (1999-2010) 
 
Source: the IMF, the World Federation of Exchanges, author s´ calculations 
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3. Inflation and the exchange rate volatility 
 
Store of value is an important function of an international currency. Central banks generally 
seek to minimize the currency risk of their foreign reserves. Thus the stable value of the 
currency is a necessary condition for making the currency to be accepted as foreign reserves 
by the central banks. Generally, there are two indictors for the stability of a currency, one is 
the inflation rate and the other one is the currency s´ exchange rate volatility.  
 
The inflation rate is a measure of inflation. It is the percentage rate of change in price level. 
That is, the rate of change in the purchasing power of money. A higher inflation rate of a 
currency means more loss of the currency s´ purchasing power. In this thesis, the annual 
percent change of average consumer prices was defined as the inflation rate, and included as 
one of the independent variables. As we discussed above, the inflation rate was expected to 
have negative impacts on the reserve share of a currency. The data of inflation rate were 
obtained from the International Monetary Fund. 
 
The other indictor for the stability of a currency is the exchange rate volatility. Volatility is 
interpreted as uncertainty, and uncertainty is viewed as a risk in financial market. Obviously, 
for those monetary authorities whose aim is to minimize the currency risk, they have lower 
incentive to hold the international currency with higher exchange rate volatility as their 
foreign reserves. Thus, the exchange rate volatility was also expected to have negative effects 
on the reserve share of a currency. Generally, exchange rate volatility is measured with 
reference to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR). Chen et al (2009) have attempted to use the 
annualized standard deviation of daily percentage change of the exchange rate of a currency 
against the SDR as the exchange rate volatility. This thesis follows their method of 
calculating the exchange rate volatility. All calculations were based on the data from the 
International Monetary Fund. 
 
4. Network externalities 
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In international trade and financial transactions, people tend to use the currency which is 
already widely used in the economy. This phenomenon can be shown in the history of pounds 
sterling. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States surpassed the United 
Kingdom in economic size, but the British pounds retained its dominant position until the end 
of the World War II, and a dollar-centered international monetary system was established in 
1944 at Bretton Woods. It suggests that there is a considerable inertia in currency use, and the 
inertia is even more important than some intrinsic characteristics of the currency, at least for 
the short term. The United Kingdom has enjoyed the inertia, and the United States is enjoying 
it when the world is under the reign of the U.S dollar. Chinn and Frankel (2005) used the 
prominence of English to explain the network externalities of a currency. They suggested that 
English is the most widely used language in the world while it is not the most ideal one. 
Moreover, an international currency is general coupled with a large, free and well-developed 
financial market, and this would contribute to keep its international role. Most countries are 
more likely to use the currency is used by other countries. It is difficult for these countries to 
accept a less entrenched currency. Thus, the inertia of network externality is expected to have 
positive impacts on the reserve share of a currency. Chinn and Frankel (2005) have used a 
lagged dependent variable to capture the effect of the inertia. This thesis follows their way to 
consider the network externality as an independent variable. 
 
      Table 4.1: Currency Share of Reserve Holdings and Determinants: Some Indictors 
 The United States The United Kingdom Switzerland Japan Euro Area China Date 
Currency Share in 
Foreign Reserves (%) 
61.84 3.93 0.13 3.66 26.01 NA 2010 
GDP share 19.472 2.948 0.438 5.871 14.538 13.576 2010 
Market Capitalization 
(U.S. dollar, Bill) 
17283 3613 1229 4100 5907 4028 2010 
Inflation Rate 
(percentage) 
1.64 2.34 0.69 -0.72 1.62 1.38 2010 
Exchange Rate Volatility 0.37 0.56 0.54 0.69 0.53 0.36 2010 
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Data Sources: the International Monetary Fund, the World Federation of Exchanges, and 
author s´ calculation. 
Notes: 1. GDP share is the gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) 
share of world total. 
2. The inflation rate is the annual percentages of average consumer price are 
year-on-year changes. 
       3. The exchange rate volatility is the annualized standard deviation of daily percentage 
changes of the exchange rate against SDR. 
 
In order to answer whether the euro would eventually surpass the dollar as leading 
international reserve currency, Chinn and Frankel (2005) has established a well-developed 
model to analyze the potential determinants of international reserves currency shares. This 
thesis established a similar model to the one used in their paper. 
 
The data collected are panel data, which contain observations over both units and time. Thus, 
a panel data model should be used in here. A fixed effect model is selected. A fixed effect 
model is a statistical model that represents the observed quantities in terms of explanatory 
variables that are treated as if the quantities were non-random.  
 
The model is a liner model, and it can be represented by the following equation: 
                                                                 
                                                              (1) 
 
In the equation (1), the       is a currency s´ share in the total allocated world foreign 
reserves. The           is the GDP share of a currency s´ home country in the world total. 
The                      is the percentage of stock market in the total of the five 
economies. The           and the            are the inflation rate (percent change) and 
exchange rate volatility of a currency, respectively. The exchange rate volatility is annualized 
standard deviation of daily percentage change of the exchange rate of a currency against the 
SDR.           denotes the lagged dependent variable. The                    are the 
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coefficients of these five independent variables. Between them, the              are 
expected to have positive signs, while           are expected to have negative signs. The   
refers to the different reserve currencies (the U.S. dollar, British pounds sterling, Japanese 
yen, Swiss franc and euro). The sample period is from 1999 to 2010. 
 
Table 4.2 shows the regression results of the model above: 
 
Table 4.2: The regression results of equation (1) 
Variables Coefficients 
          0.060 
(0.138) 
                     0.139* 
(0.071) 
          0.775*** 
(0.259) 
           -2.151** 
(0.940) 
          0.731*** 
(0.062) 
Constant 3.191 
(2.036) 
Number of 
obversations 
55 
Adj R-squared 0.998 
Note: the standard errors of coefficients are in ( ). 
*** Very significant p-Value < 1 %, ** Significant P-Value 1-5 %,  
* P-Value 5-10 % 
 
According to the results shown in the table 1, the stock market capitalization share and the 
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lagged dependent variable are significant, consistent with the results in Chen et al (2009). The 
inflation rate and exchange rate volatility are also statistically significant. Surprisingly is that 
the GDP share is insignificant. Li and Liu (2008) has focused on the determinants of 
international reserve currency shares, they suggested that the GDP share was a significant 
variable. However, the inflation rate is insignificant in their regression results. But the 
empirical analysis of this thesis provides an opposite result. A possible explanation is that the 
short-term changes in reserve holdings maybe influenced by exchange rate and interest rate 
movements. However, in the long term, the international status of a currency is determined 
mainly by more fundamental factors, such as the size of economy (Chen et. al 2009). The 
sample period in Li and Liu (2008) is from 1967 to 2004 while the sample period in this 
thesis is from 1999 to 2010. Therefore, their research was more likely to estimate the factors 
which have impacts on reserve currency share in a long term, and this thesis tends to provide 
an estimate for a relative short term. 
 
After abandoning the two insignificant variables, the final estimate is represented by the 
following equation: 
 
                                                                    
                                                                         (2) 
 
According to the equation above, the coefficient of the share of stock market capitalization is 
0.145, which means stock market capitalization has a positive impact on the reserve share. If 
the share of stock market capitalization rises by 1 percentage point, the reserve share would 
increase by 0.145 percentage point.  
 
Surprisingly as well is that the inflation rate s´ coefficient is also positive. Actually, the 
coefficient of inflation rate is expected to be negative, and the inflation rate is expected to 
have a negative impact on the reserve share, because a higher inflation rate of a currency 
generally means more loss of the currency s´ purchasing power. However, in the regression 
results, its coefficient is 0.794, which indicates that an increase in the inflation rate by 1 
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percentage point would lead to a rise in the reserve currency share by 0.794 percentage point.  
 
The coefficient of exchange rate volatility is -2.267, which means the reserve share would 
decrease by 2.267 percentage point if the volatility increases by 1. 
 
As expected, the lagged dependent variable has a positive coefficient, 0.729, which is close to 
the estimates in some previous researches (e.g. Chinn and Frankel, 2005). This indicates that 
the “inertia” has a positive and significant impact on the reserve share. One percentage point 
increase in the reserve share in this year would lead to the reserve share rise by 0.729 
percentage point in next year. 
 
4.2 The potential international status of the renminbi as an international 
reserve currency 
 
One of the purposes in this thesis is to gauge the potential international status of the renminbi 
as an international reserve currency. The equation (2) above shows the relevant determinants 
of the reserve share of a currency, and the coefficients of these determinants. Thus, the 
potential international significance of the renminbi as a reserve currency can be calculated 
based on the values of China s´ GDP share, inflation rate and the renminbi s´ reverse share in 
the previous year. 
 
Nowadays, the share of stock market capitalization in the total of the six markets (including 
China) was 11.139 percent in 2010. The inflation rate and the exchange rate volatility were 
3.325 and 0.364 in 2010, respectively. The data of these three variables are available from the 
International Monetary Funds. However, the record of the renminbi s´ reserve cannot be 
obtained. The IMF s´ Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves database 
only provides the reserve shares of the five major international currencies. There is no data on 
the volume of the renminbi was held as foreign reserves by central banks. Actually, it is 
believed that the reserve share of the renminbi is very small, as the limited capital account 
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convertibility of the renminbi. The restrictions for renminbi capital account transaction are 
viewed as a major obstacle to the internationalization of the renminbi, because an 
international currency, particularly a reserve currency, must be easily tradable in international 
trade and financial transactions. If a country imposes restrictions on capital flows, it would 
have negative impacts on the convertibility of its currency. Central banks have less incentive 
to hold a currency with limited convertibility as their foreign reserves. Thus, the lagged 
reserve share of the renminbi is assumed to be 0 percent. Based on data, the renminbi s´ share 
in the world reserves would be about 7.2 percent. Chen et al (2009) have estimated the 
potential reserve share of the renminbi based on the data from 1999 to 2006. They suggested 
that the renminbi s´ share would be about 10 percent. The estimate in this thesis is broadly in 
line with their estimation. 
 
It should be noted that there is a hidden assumption in the equation above. In order to explore 
the determinants of international reserve currency share, five current major international 
currencies (the U.S. dollar, British pounds sterling, Japanese yen, Swiss franc and euro) were 
included into the database. All of them are fully convertible. Therefore, the hidden 
assumption about the estimate on renminbi s´ potential reserve share is that the renminbi 
should become fully convertible. That is, China should gradually remove the restrictions on 
capital account if it is seeking a more significant international role for renminbi. 
 
4.3 Renminbi s´ influence on the exchange rates of ASEAN members 
 
A number of economists (e.g., Li and Ding, 2010; Zhang and Sun, 2003) have suggested that 
the regionalization should be the first step of the internationalization of the renminbi. As 
Cohen (2012) suggested, renminbi s´ internationalization is a long march with a plenty of 
obstacles and uncertainties. China s´ president Hu Jintao has answered the questions with 
Washington Post, “It takes a long time for a country s´ currency to be widely accepted in the 
world. And making the renminbi an international currency will be a fairly long process”. 
However, the regionalization of the renminbi in Southeast Asia is much more likely to be 
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achievable in the foreseeable future. Actually, China s´ monetary authority has made some 
efforts to promote the regionalization of the renminbi in Southeast Asia. Through the efforts 
of China, most members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have 
signed the local currency swap agreements with China. The renminbi deposits in ASEAN 
countries grow rapidly since all ASEAN member countries were covered by China s´ cross 
border trade settlement pilot scheme. The announcement of Chiang Mai Initiative is also 
viewed as an attempt to promote the renminbi as an international reserve currency. In 
addition to these improvements, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area was created in 2010, it 
reduced tariff, and made commodities, services, labor and capital move freely. The 
elimination of tariff barriers and free movement of production elements are prerequisites to 
establish a monetary union. Although it is unlikely to create a common currency like euro in 
Asia, the establishment of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area was supposed to contribute to 
facilitate renminbi regionalization. 
 
In addition to the efforts from China s´ government, the market forces also increase 
renminbi s´ influence on ASEAN. Most ASEAN members adopt an export-led growth 
strategy. Their export products are usually similar to China s´ exports. They are in fierce 
competition with China in international market. In order to maintain the competitiveness of 
their export products, ASEAN countries have incentive to moving away from a dollar bloc 
and peg to renminbi (Kawai, 2008). 
 
In the second half of 1990s, the Japanese monetary launched the internationalization of the 
yen, and the influence of yen increased rapidly in East Asia during that period. Frankel and 
Wei (1994) have introduced a framework to explore its impacts on the exchange rate policies 
of the East Asian Economies. In this section, a similar model was established to test the 
renminbi s´ impacts on a number of Asian currencies, and it can be represented by the 
following equation: 
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                                                                        (3) 
 
where               denotes five currencies of ASEAN members, including Thai Baht, 
Indonesian Rupiah, Singapore Dollar, Philippine Peso and Malaysian Ringgit. Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines are included into the ASEAN six majors. ASEAN 
six majors refer to the six largest economies in ASEAN with economies many times larger 
than the remaining four ASEAN countries. The sixth is Vietnam. Only the five largest was 
included into the model, as the data about the exchange rate of Vietnamese Dong is not 
available. The                                                  are the U.S. 
dollar, euro, Japanese yen, British pounds sterling, Chinese renminbi and Swiss franc, 
respectively. The U.S. dollar, euro, British pounds sterling and Japanese yen are the four 
most important international currencies, which play crucial roles in the international 
monetary system. Thus they are clearly on the list of candidates. China is the largest economy 
in East Asia, and one purpose of this thesis is to estimate renminbi s´ impacts on ASEAN, so 
renminbi is included into the model. Frankel and Wei (1994) suggested that in the case of a 
perfect basket peg, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression would display the correct weights 
regardless of the choice of numeraire used to measure the values of currencies. However, if 
the currency was not perfectly pegged to any basket, the choice of numeraire would affect the 
interpretation of the error term. As the Swiss franc is widely considered as one of the most 
stable currencies, and it is one of major reserve currency, in this thesis, the values of all 
currencies are represented by their exchange rate against the Swiss franc. For example, the 
                    denotes the value of the U.S. dollar in terms of the Swiss franc. The 
   is the daily change rate of a currency s´ value.    is the coefficient, it represents the 
importance of the corresponding currency in the currency basket. The sum of the      
should be close to one. 
 
There are two sample periods in this thesis. The first period is from 1 January 1999 to 20 July 
2005. The second period begins from 21 July 2005 to 1 August 2012. The cut-off point is set 
on July 21 2005 because China implemented a reform of the exchange rate regime on that 
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day. The purpose of this section is to compare the renminbi s´ influence on ASEAN 
currencies during the two different periods. All data used in this section are obtained from the 
International Monetary Fund. 
 
The first sample period (1/1/1999-20/07/2005): 
 
Table 4.3 shows the regression results for the period before the exchange rate reform. 
 
Table 4.3: The estimation results for the first period (1/1/1999-20/07/2005). 
 Thai Baht Indonesian 
Rupiah 
Singapore 
Dollar 
Philippine 
Peso 
Malaysian 
Ringgit 
U.S. dollar 
   
-4.672 
(3.45) 
6.605 
(17.877) 
-3.142 
(2.203) 
 1*** 
Euro     0.016 
(0.033) 
0.245*** 
(0.095) 
0.004 
(0.020) 
  
Japanese 
Yen    
0.201*** 
(0.016) 
0.213*** 
(0.045) 
0.191*** 
(0.010) 
  
Pounds 
sterling   
0.031 
(0.025) 
-0.004 
(0.066) 
0.040** 
(0.016) 
  
Renminbi 
   
5.394 
(3.449) 
-5.928 
(17.878) 
3.849* 
(2.203) 
  
Constant    0.011 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.026) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
  
Adjusted 
R-2 
0.777 0.51 0.884  1 
Observations 1322  667 1403 0 1435 
Note: the standard errors of the coefficients are in ( ). 
*** Very significant p-Value < 1 %, ** Significant P-Value 1-5 %, * P-Value 5-10 % 
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The data about the exchange rate of Philippine Peso starts from 21 September 2010, thus 
there is no data for Philippine in the first sample period. Before July 2005, Malaysia officially 
pegged the U.S. dollar. The exchange rate of Malaysian Ringgit against the U.S. dollar was 
retained at around 8.2768. Thus, obviously, the U.S. dollar was significant and equal to 1 for 
the Malaysian Ringgit. However, the U.S. dollar was insignificant for the other three ASEAN 
currencies: Thai Bat, Indonesian Rupiah and Singapore dollar. According to table 4.3, 
Japanese yen has the largest influence on ASEAN currencies as it is significant for all the 
three ASEAN currencies. For Thai Baht, the Japanese yen was the only one variable whose 
coefficient was significant. The euro only had impact on the exchange rate of Indonesian 
Rupiah, and its coefficient is even larger than the coefficient of Japan yen. Similarly, the 
British pounds is only significant in the equation of the Singapore dollar, and its coefficient is 
only 0.04. The renminbi is also significant for Singapore, and its coefficient is 3.849, which 
means the movement of the exchange rate of Singapore was mainly influenced by the 
renminbi. 
 
Goodness of fit is reasonable for most of the four equations. Malaysian Ringgit s´ adjust    
is equal to 1 as it officially pegged the U.S. dollar. The adjusted    of Singapore Dollar, 
Thai Baht and Indonesian Rupiah are 0.884 and 0.777, respectively. Indonesian Rupiah has a 
relative small adjusted   , 0.51, it indicates that the explanatory of the equation for 
Indonesian Rupiah is relative low. 
 
The second sample period (21/07/2005-01/08/2012) 
 
Table 4.4 shows the regression results for the period after the exchange rate reform. 
 
Table 4.4: The estimation results for the second period (21/07/2005-01/08/2012). 
 Thai Baht Indonesian 
Rupiah 
Singapore 
Dollar 
Philippine 
Peso 
Malaysian 
Ringgit 
U.S. dollar    0.477*** 0.308 -0.261*** 0.627* -0.091 
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(0.087) (0.213) (0.080) (0.195) (0.096) 
Euro     0.038* 
(0.020) 
0.197*** 
(0.053) 
0.210*** 
(0.019) 
0.010 
(0.044) 
0.181*** 
(0.023) 
Japanese Yen    0.028** 
(0.013) 
-0.192*** 
(0.033) 
-0.029** 
(0.012) 
0.022 
(0.038) 
-0.083*** 
(0.015) 
Pounds sterling   0.057*** 
(0.016) 
0.039 
(0.040) 
0.072*** 
(0.015) 
0.052 
(0.055) 
0.053*** 
(0.018) 
Renminbi    0.416*** 
(0.090) 
0.631*** 
(0.220) 
1.015*** 
(0.083) 
0.289 
(0.206) 
0.968*** 
(0.099) 
Constant    -0.012 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.024) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.023) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
Adjusted R-2 0.855 0.418 0.819 0.835 0.792 
Observations 1348 1439 1480 346 1439 
Note: the standard errors of the coefficients are in ( ). 
*** Very significant p-Value < 1 %, ** Significant P-Value 1-5 %, * P-Value 5-10 % 
 
In the first period, the coefficient of the U.S. dollar was only significant for Malaysian 
Ringgit. However, in the second sample period, the dollar is statistically significant for Thai 
Baht, Singapore Dollar and Philippine Peso, except Indonesian Rupiah and Malaysian 
Ringgit. Actually, in July 2005, Malaysia officially abandoned the dollar peg. Euro, the 
Japanese yen, British pounds and renminbi are significant in the equation of Malaysian 
Ringgit. And renminbi s´ coefficient is 0.968, much higher than other four currencies. 
Renminbi has largest influence on the exchange rate of Malaysian Ringgit. Actually, the 
Bank Malaysia has announced that it was purchasing Chinese government bonds, and 
renminbi was held as an important reserve currency by them. The only significant variable in 
the equation of Philippine Peso is the U.S. dollar. All euro, Japanese yen and renminbi are 
significant for Indonesian Rupiah, and renminbi s´ coefficient is the largest one. The exchange 
rate of Indonesian Rupiah in the second period is mainly determined by the renminbi. In the 
equation for the Thai Baht and Singapore Dollar, all variable are significant. For Thai Baht, 
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the U.S. dollar has the largest influence on the exchange rate of Thai Baht, and the coefficient 
of the renminbi is the second largest one. In the equation for Singapore Dollar, renminbi has 
the largest coefficient. 
 
All adjusted    are generally reasonable except the Indonesian Rupiah. In the first sample 
period, Indonesian Rupiah also has the lowest adjusted   . 
 
It is obvious that the effect of renminbi on ASEAN currencies has experienced a significant 
growth during the two sample periods while the effects of Japanese yen diminished. The 
renminbi is more likely to be the Asia anchor currency than Japanese yen. 
 
This result supports the optimum anchor currency area (OACA) theory that the increase in 
share of intra-regional trade volume, countries in this region have incentive to pegging to a 
regional anchor, even no monetary union exist in this area. 
 
The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area not only increased the trade volume between China and 
ASEAN, also contributed to the regionalization of the renminbi. 
 
Meanwhile, the result also confirms the studies of political economics on international 
currency. China s´ government designed and signed a series of currency swap agreements and 
cross border trade settlement pilot schemes with various countries through diplomatic 
negotiations. This can be viewed as an example that politics have influence on the role of an 
international currency. And the renminbi is playing a role as a negotiated currency. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
As discussed in the introduction, before opening the capital account, China s´ monetary 
authority should estimate the potential international status of the renminbi. Thus, based on 
previous researches, this thesis tries to establish a model to explore the determinants of 
international reserve currency shares. Based on the model in the empirical section, the 
potential reserve share of the renminbi would be 7.2%, but the prerequisite is that the 
restrictions on the capital account must be removed. Actually, capital account convertibility is 
a critical condition. If a currency lacks capital account convertibility, it never has the chance 
to become a dominant international currency. It is undoubted that the restrictions on capital 
account must be removed, if China hopes to promote renminbi as a major international 
reserve currency. However, if the restrictions were removed too fast, China s´ economy would 
suffer huge risks, especially the financial sector. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 clearly 
showed the consequences. Thailand and other South East Asian Countries opened their 
capital account before the establishment of solid and healthy financial sectors. The openness 
of their capital accounts increased the vulnerability of their financial institutions to exogenous 
shocks. Thus, based on the experiences of these neighbors, it is wise to remove China s´ 
restrictions on the currency convertibility gradually. The capital account liberalization must 
not outpace the strengthening of the domestic financial sector and monitoring capability. 
Moreover, according to the estimation in this thesis, the size of the market capitalization has 
positive effects on the international status of a currency. That is, the development of financial 
market is not only necessary for opening the capital account, but also conducive to 
significantly increase the renminbi s´ potential reserve share. Thus, it is advisable to build a 
deep, liquid, free and safe financial market patiently before releasing the restrictions on 
capital account, even if it would take a rather long time to attain the goal.  
 
In addition, according to the estimation of the second model in the thesis, China can 
concentrate on promoting the regionalization of the renminbi before the openness of capital 
account. In some sense, the emergence of the euro can be viewed as the internationalization 
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of the Deutsche mark. The euro zone was officially founded in 1999, actually, as Germany s´ 
huge economic size and the stable value of its currency, the Deutsche mark always played the 
role of anchor currency in Europe before the launch of the euro. The result of the second 
model in this thesis suggests that China has the potential to become a regional anchor 
currency. Thus, based on Germany s´ experiences, China can continue to strengthen 
renminbi s´ role in Southeast Asia. With the development of globalization and the efforts of 
the governments, Asian economies are linked more closely than ever. The financial 
integration and cooperation among Asian countries are conducive to stabilize the value of 
their currencies, and beneficial to all of them. For both China and the ASEAN, the economic 
relationship between them is more and more important in these years. In this context, China 
could pursue more opportunities to strengthen cooperation in trade and finance with the 
ASEAN members. And it is an effective way to increase the international use of the renminbi 
and promote renminbi s´ regionalization in this region. There are still a plenty of work need to 
be done before removing the restrictions on capital account.  
 
The internationalization of the renminbi is a long process. At current growth rate, China 
would surpass the United States and become the largest economy in the 2030s. However, as 
the existence of network externalities, renminbi needs to take much longer time to replace the 
status of the U.S. dollar. The Nobel laureate in economics, Robert Mundell, has said 
confidently that “the renminbi is likely to become a reserve currency in the future, even if the 
government of China does nothing about it. The progress of the renminbi as an international 
currency is assured” (Cohen, 2012). In some sense, his words can be understood as patience 
and cautiousness. China s´ monetary authority needs to determine the pace and form of the 
internationalization of the renminbi very patiently and cautiously, especially the removal of 
the restrictions on renminbi s´ convertibility. Sometimes, it is better to do nothing than to do 
something wrong. 
 
 
 
37 
References  
 
Andrews D.M. (2006): International Monetary Power, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Andrews D.M. (2006): “Monetary Power and Monetary Statecraft”, in D.M. Andrews (ed.), 
International Monetary Power, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 
 
Chen H., Peng W., and Shu C. (2009): “The potential of the Renminbi as an International 
Currency”. BIS Asian Research Program Research Papers. February 2009. 
 
Chey H.K. (2012): “The Theories of International Currencies and the Future of the World 
Monetary Order”. International Studies Review, Volume 14, Issue 1, pages 51–77, March 
2012. 
 
Chinn M. and Frankel J. (2005): “Will the Euro Eventually Surpass the Dollar as Leading 
International Reserve Currency”. Presented at NBER conference, Newport, RI, June 1-2, 
2005. 
 
Cipolla C.M. (1956): Money, Price, and Civilization in the Mediterranean World: Fifth to 
Seventeenth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956. 
 
Cohen B.J. (1998): The Geography of Money. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). 
 
Cohen, B.J. (2006): “The Macrofoundations of Monetary Power”, in D.M. Andrews (ed.), 
International Monetary Power, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
 
Cohen B.J. (2012): “The Yuan´s Long March: Can an International Currency Be 
Manufactured”, in New Political Economy, 2012. 
 
Elwell C.K. (2007): “The Dollar s´ Future as the World s´ Reserve Currency: The Challenge of 
the Euro”, July 10, Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, Congressional 
Research Service. 
 
Fischer S. (1998): “Capital-account Liberalization and the Role of the IMF”. Essays in 
International Finance, No.207, May 1998. Princeton University. 
 
Frankel J.A. (2011): “Historical Precedents for Internationalization of the RMB”. CGS/IIGG 
Working Paper. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. 
 
Frankel J.A. and Wei S.J. (1994): “Yen Bloc or Dollar Bloc? Exchange Rate Policies of the 
East Asian Economies”, in A. Krueger and T. Ito (ed.), Macroeconomic Linkage: Savings, 
Exchange Rates, and Capital Flows, University of Chicago Press, pages 295-333. 
38 
 
Galati G. and Wooldridge P.D, (2009): “The Euro as a Reserve Currency: a Challenge to the 
Pre-eminence of the US dollar”. International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley 
& Sons, Ltd., vol. 14 (1), page 1-23. 
 
Gao H. And Yu Y. (2009): “Internationalization of the Renminbi”. BoK-BIS Seminar, Seoul, 
March 19-20. 
 
Genberg H. (2009): “Currency Internationalization: Analytical and Policy Issues”. HKIMR 
Working Paper No.31/2009. 
 
Greenspan A. (2001): “The Euro as an International Currency”. Paper presented at the Euro 
50 Group Roundtable, Washington, D.C., November 30. 
 
Helleiner E. (2008): “Political Determinants of International Currencies: What Future for the 
US Dollar”. Review of International Political Economy 15: 354–378. 
 
Kawai M. (2008): “the Role of Asian Currencies in the International Monetary System”. 
Paper presented at 2008 Macro Research Conference on the global monetary and financial 
system and its governance, 11-12nd November 2008, Tokyo. 
 
Kenen P. (1983): “The Role of the Dollar as an International Currency”. Occasional Papers 
No. 13, Group of Thirty, NY. 
 
Kenen P. (2009): “Currency Internationalization - an Overview”, manuscript. Bok-BIS 
Seminar on currency internationalization: Lessons from the global financial crisis and 
prospects for the future in Asia and the Pacific. Seoul, Republic of Korea. 19-20 March. 
 
Koepke R. (2009): “The Demise of the Dollar and the Rise of Regionalism: A theory of 
Optimum Anchor Currency Areas”. Journal of International Service, Fall 2009. 
 
Krugman P.R. (1984): “The International Role of the Dollar: Theory and Prospect”, in F.O. 
Bilson and C. Marston (ed.), Exchange Rate Theory and Practice, University of Chicago 
Press, ISBN 0-226-05096-3. P. 261- 278. 
 
Li D. and Liu L. (2008): “RMB Internationalization: an Empirical and Policy Analysis”. 
Journal of Financial Research, 2008 (11): pages 1-16. 
 
Li X. and Ding Y. (2010): Renminbi Regionalization (1
st
 edition). Beijing: Tsing Hua 
University Press, 2010: 53-55. 
 
Lopz R.S. (1951): “The International Role of the Dollar”. Journal of Economic History, 11 
(summer 1951): 209-234. 
 
39 
Matsuyama K., Kiyotaki N. and Matsui A. (1991): “Toward a Theory of International 
Currency”. Discussion Paper No. 931. 
 
McCauley (2011): “Internationalization of the Renminbi and China´s Financial Development 
Model”. BIS Quarterly Review, December 2011. 
 
Mundell R.A. (1993):  “EMU and the International Monetary System: A Transatlantic 
Perspective”. Working Paper No. 13. Vienna: Austrian National Bank. 
 
Persaud A. (2004): “When Currency Empires Fall”. 321 gold, October 11th, 2004. 
 
Reserve Bank of India (1997): “Report of the Committee on Capital Account Convertibility”. 
RBI, 1997. 
 
Song Z. And Song H. (2012): “Opportunities and Challenges of Renminbi 
Internationalization”. 2012 Second International Conference on Social Science and Humanity. 
IACSIT Press, Singapore. 
 
Strange S. (1971): Sterling and British Policy: a Political Study of an International Currency 
in Decline. London: Oxford University Press. 
 
Subacchi P. (2010): “One Currency, Two Systems: China’s Renminbi Strategy”. Chatham 
House Briefing Paper (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs). 
 
Yeager L.B. (1976): International Monetary Relations: Theory, History and Policy (2
nd
 
edition). New York: Harper & Row, 1976. 
 
Yu Y. (2012): “Revisiting the Internationalization of the Yuan”. ADBI Working Paper 336. 
Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. 
 
Zhang Y. And Sun S. (2003): Asian and Pacific Blue Book: the Asian and Pacific Area 
Development Reports (1
st
 edition). Beijing: Social Science Literature Publishing House, 2003: 
20-23.  
 
Zhou X.C. (2009): “Reform the International Monetary System”. Working Paper of the 
People s´ Bank of China, 23 March 2009. 
 
II BRIC Summit (2010). “The Joint Statement of the II BRIC Summit 2010”. 
 
Data Sources: 
 
IMF. “Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER)”. 
40 
 
IMF. “World Economic Outlook Database 2012”. 
 
IMF. “Exchange Rates Data”. 
 
World Federation of Exchanges. “Market Capitalization of Shares of Domestic Companies”. 
